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The U.S. has pursued three policy objectives in Asia
since World War II. They are 1) freedom of the seas; 2)
access to the markets of the region; and 3) preventing the
domination of the region by any single power. To achieve
these goals, the U.S. has committed to maintain 100,000
forward deployed-troops in Asia. Currently, 37,000 are
stationed in South Korea. North Korea is in crisis. Seven
years of negative GDP growth, severe food shortages,
several high level defections and North Korea's political
isolation all indicate that North Korea is on the verge of
collapse. This thesis argues that the collapse of North
Korea is imminent. Once Korea is unified under South
Korea, the U. S. will not need 37,000 troops in Korea. When
the U.S. withdraws its troops from Korea, a potential arms
race could ensue. To prevent this, the U.S. should
increase its naval presence after the withdrawal of
American ground forces. The U.S. should consider the
possibility of home porting a nuclear aircraft carrier in
Korea. This proposed policy would solve the problem
created by Japan's refusal to host U.S. nuclear powered
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I . INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, the United States has
pursued three broad policy objectives in Asia. They are 1)
freedom of the seas; 2) unimpeded access to the markets of
the region; and 3) preventing the domination of the region
by a single power or group of powers. 1 In order to achieve
these policy objectives, the United States entered into a
series of bilateral security agreements with several
countries in Asia. In Northeast Asia, the United States
has security agreements with two key allies. The
agreements are with Japan and the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) . The United States commitment to maintain forward-
deployed forces in both Japan and South Korea has been a
central element of United States security policy. These
forward-deployed forces have been instrumental in
maintaining stability in the region, especially on the
Korean Peninsula. In 1997, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen reaffirmed this commitment in his Quadrennial Defense
Review. He said "the United States would indefinitely
maintain the current 100,000 forward-deployed troop level
1 Kim R. Holmes and Thomas G. Moore, Restoring American Leadership ,
(Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1996) 52.
in Asia." 2 Of the 100,000 forward-deployed troops, 37,000
are stationed in South Korea.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North
Korea) is currently experiencing severe food shortages.
Many international aid agencies predict mass starvation in
the near future unless a monumental relief effort is
launched. Additionally, several high level North Korean
officials have recently defected. Finally, North Korea has
experienced seven straight years of negative economic
growth. The current conditions in North Korea have led
many scholars and regional security experts to predict that
North Korea is on the verge of both economic and political
collapse. The prospect of a unified Korean Peninsula is
more likely now than it has been at any time since 1953. 3
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate what impact
Korean unification will have on long standing United States
security policy in Asia. I will propose three scenarios
that could lead to the unification of Korea. I will assign
a rank order to the scenarios and determine which is most
likely to occur. Finally, I will make recommendations as
2 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review ,
(Washington: GPO, 1997) 31.
* For example see Selig B. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in
Korea." Foreign Policy 106 (Spring 1997): 57-75 and Edward A. Olsen,
to what United States security policy in Asia should be
following Korean unification.
There has been little discussion as to what United
States security policy in Asia should be following Korean
unification. This thesis will offer some suggestions and
will hopefully spur debate on this important topic.
"Coping with the Korean Peace Process: An American View," The Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. IX, No. 1 (Summer 1997): 159-180.

II. UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY IN ASIA
A. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought the
Cold War to an abrupt and surprising end. The communist
containment policy which had been at the center of United
States foreign and military policy for over forty-five
years suddenly ceased to exist. In Congress, a consensus
emerged that American taxpayers were due the spoils of
victory. The spoils would be in the form of a peace
dividend. The United States, lacking a peer military
competitor, could now afford to draw down its military and
divert the savings to domestic programs or tax cuts.
The Bush administration called for a re-evaluation of
United States military force structure with special
emphasis on realigning or recalling forward-deployed
forces. As a result of the review, the administration
adopted the so-called "Base Force" strategy. The principle
behind the strategy was to downsize the military while
maintaining a modest forward-deployed presence in both
Europe and Asia. The policy called for a force reduction of
approximately 32,000 personnel in Asia between 1990-1995.
Building on the "Base Force" strategy, Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin initiated the Bottom-Up Review in 1993.
The goal of the Bottom-Up Review was to reassess all of our
defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up. 5
As a result of the Bottom-Up Review, the United States
defense budget has been slashed from some 400 billion
dollars in 1986 at the height of the Cold War, to 250
billion dollars in 1997. 6
The growing isolationist sentiments in Washington and
the withdrawal of United States forces began to alarm Asian
leaders. They feared that the United States would
completely withdraw from Asia, creating a potential power
vacuum and subsequently unleashing an arms race. To allay
these fears, the Bottom-Up Review reaffirmed the United
States commitment to Asia. The report states that peacetime
overseas presence of our forces is the single most visible
demonstration of our commitment to defend United States and
4 William T. Tow, "Changing US Force Levels and Regional Security",
Contemporary Security Policy, (August 1994): 12.
3 Les Aspin, Report of the Bottom-Up Review
, (Washington: GPO, 1993),
iii
.
6 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , National
Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1998 , (Washington: GPO, 1997), 78-79.
allied interests in Europe, Asia and elsewhere in the
world. 7
Additionally, the report states that the United States
planned to retain close to 100,000 forward-deployed troops
in Northeast Asia. President Clinton also announced that
United States troops would stay in South Korea as long as
the South Korean people want and need them. 8
The just completed Quadrennial Defense Review
reaffirms this policy and pledges that the United States
will indefinitely maintain the 100,000 troop level in the
Asia/Pacific region. The Quadrennial Defense Review states
that
:
These deployed forces underscore our commitment
to remain engaged as a stabilizing influence in
the region, alleviates the potential for a
destabilizing arms race in the region,
underwrites deterrence on the Korean Peninsula
and elsewhere, and strengthens our voice in
international forums dealing not only with Asian




This chapter will answer two questions. First, what




and second, what are United States vital national security
interests in Asia?
B. UNITED STATES SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA
The United States has security agreements with two key
allies in Northeast Asia. The security agreements are with
Japan and South Korea.
1 . United States-Japan Security Agreement
The unconditional surrender of Japan at the end of
World War II led to the United States occupation and
control over every facet of the country. General Douglas
MacArthur as the Supreme Allied Commander was in charge of
occupation forces in Japan. His orders were to:
1. Ensure that Japan will not again become a
menace to the United States or to the peace and
security of the world.
2. To bring about the eventual establishment of a
peaceful and responsible government that will
respect the rights of other states and will
support the ideals and principals of the United
Nations Charter. 10
General MacArthur embarked on a series of major
reforms in order to transform Japanese society into a
peaceful democracy. These reforms affected all levels of
society and included: land reforms, establishment of rights
and liberties, emancipation of women, release of political
prisoners, liberalization of education and development of
trade unions. 11
The capstone of the reforms would be a new Japanese
constitution. General MacArthur ordered his staff to draw
up a new constitution and on 3 May 1947, the new
constitution was enacted. The constitution included
Article IX commonly referred to as the anti-war clause. The
Article reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat of force as a means of
settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as
war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the State will not be
recognized. 12
Article IX effectively eliminated the military and
returned power to a civilian government for the first time
10 Masanori Nakamura, "Democratization, Peace, and Economic Development
in Occupied Japan", in The Politics Of Democratization , ed. Edward
Friedman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 63.
11 Ibid., 64.
12 Article IX of Japanese Constitution.
in many years. The reforms and new constitution planted
the seeds of democracy in Japan.
In 1950, a peace treaty between Japan and the United
States was put on the agenda. John Foster Dulles was
appointed to negotiate the peace treaty. He conducted
bilateral negotiations in advance of the peace conference
in order to work out the language of the treaty. The Peace
Treaty was signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951
between Japan and forty-eight nations. The People's
Republic of China and the Soviet Union were not signatories
of the treaty. 13
The peace treaty would end United States military
control over Japan. Control of the country would be
returned to a democratically elected civilian government.
However, the Peace Constitution would leave Japan
defenseless. Japan and the United States therefore
negotiated the separate United States-Japan security
agreement, which was also signed on September 8, 1951.
The treaty required the United States to provide for
the defense of Japan. In return, Japan would give the
United States the right to base troops in Japan and
13 Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan The Story Of A Nation , (New York: McGraw-
Hill Publishing Co., 1990), 198-201.
10
contribute financially to help offset the costs to the U.S.
As a result of the treaty, the United States now has
approximately 45,000 forward-deployed troops in Japan. The
troops are based in both Okinawa and Japan. In Okinawa the
United States has one Marine Expeditionary Force, and an
Army Special Forces battalion. In Japan the United States
has one aircraft carrier and one amphibious assault ship
plus their escort ships. Additionally the Air Force has
approximately one and one-half wings of combat aircraft
stationed in Japan and Okinawa. In 1996, Japan paid the
United States over five billion dollars for the forward-
deployed forces. 14
The United States-Japan security agreement has served
both countries well. Japan was able to concentrate on
economic development without the immense financial burden
of re-arming. The United States was able to use the
forward-deployed forces to support the containment policy
and to support the forward-deployed forces in Korea.
a. Japan's Self-Defense Force
As Japan was adopting her new constitution, U.S.-
Soviet relations began to deteriorate. In China in 1949
Aspin, 23-24.
11
Mao Zedong and the communists would defeat the United
States supported Nationalists and win the civil war. 15 In
Korea on June 25, 1950, Soviet supported North Korean
communist forces would cross the 38 th parallel and invade
South Korea. 16
The communist advances in Asia alarmed the United
States. George F. Kennan from the State Department
developed the United States containment policy to halt the
communist advance. John Foster Dulles saw Japan as a
potential military ally in the containment policy. 17
Thus, a short time after insisting on Article IX
to de-arm Japan, the United States would reverse course and
begin to pressure Japan to re-arm. MacArthur and Japan's
Prime Minister, Yoshida, resisted Washington and insisted
on maintaining the integrity of the constitution, which
would not permit Japan to re-arm. 18
In 1953 President Eisenhower appointed John
Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. Frustrated by his
earlier failure to re-arm Japan, Dulles still believed that
15 John King Fairbank, China A New History / (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992), 337.
16 Woo-keun Han, The History Of Korea , (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1974), 505.
17 Tetsuya Kataoka and Raymon H. Myers, Defending An Economic
Superpower , (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 13.
12
Japan should contribute to the containment policy. Again,
the Yoshida government resisted re-arming citing article IX
of the constitution. Eventually, Yoshida was persuaded that
a Self-Defense Force could be established without violating
the spirit of the constitution. In 1954 Yoshida finally
acquiesced and agreed to a bill, which would establish a
220,000-man Self-Defense Force. The establishment of the
Self-Defense Forces meant that Japan would no longer have
to solely rely on the United States for its defense. 19
Military expenditures in Japan have traditionally
been limited to 1 percent of GNP. As the economy has grown,
outlays in military expenditures have also increased. In
1985, Japan spent just over 14 billion dollars on defense.
By 1995, the amount increased to just over 47 billion
dollars. 20
Japan now has a very capable military force. It
currently has 64 major surface combatants; 15 attack
submarines; 85 long-range patrol aircraft; 92 anti-
submarine helicopters; and 154 F-15 fighters. 21
18 Tetsuya Kataoka, Waiting For A Pearl Harbor , (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1980), 11-12.
19 Kataoka, 15.
20 World Fact Book 1995
,
(Washington: Central Intelligence Agency,
1995), 217.
21 David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy",
Contemporary Security Policy, (August 1994): 44.
13
The traditional role of the self-defense force
has been to protect Japan from foreign invasion. This role
included protecting territorial seas around Japan out to a
twelve-mile limit. However, in the 1980' s the mission was
expanded to include sea-lane defense up to 1,000 nautical
miles from Japan. This expanded mission would signal the
first change in Japanese defense policy since the end of
World War II. 22
2 . United States -ROK Mutual Defense Treaty
It became clear in August of 1945 that Japan would
soon lose the war in the Pacific. The United States and the
Soviet Union agreed to split the Japanese occupied Korean
Peninsula along the 38 th parallel. United States forces
would occupy the southern half while Soviet forces would
occupy the northern half. American forces arrived in Korea
on September 8, 1945. 23
The United States did not recognize the government in
Korea and instead established the United States Army
Military Government to rule over Korea. The military
' David Arase, "A Militarized Japan?" Journal of Strategic Studies,
Vol. 18 (September 1995): 88.
3 Mark Borthwick, Pacific Century The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia
,
(Boulder: Westview, 1992), 378.
14
government attempted to establish some limited social and
economic reforms. Unlike MacArthur' s administration in
postwar Japan, these reforms were not as far reaching and
did not encompass every aspect of society. The military
government was able to initiate limited land and labor
reforms . 24
One of the highest priorities for the United States in
Korea was to establish a democratically elected government.
United States and Soviet occupation forces could not agree
on elections that would cover the entire country.
Eventually, separate elections were held in the South and
the North. Both of the newly elected governments claimed
to be the legitimate rulers of the entire peninsula.
Sensing that the situation in Korea was somewhat stable,
Soviet forces withdrew in 1948 and American forces withdrew
in 1949. With both North and South Korea holding
unification as one of their primary policy objectives, the





On 25 June 1950, in an effort to unify the
peninsula, North Korean forces crossed the 38 th parallel and
attacked South Korea. United States forces quickly came to
the aid of South Korea and conducted a major amphibious
landing in Inchon. The North Korean forces were pushed out
of South Korea all the way up to the Chinese border. China
feared that the United States would cross the border into
China, so they joined in battle alongside the North
Koreans. The Chinese and North Koreans eventually pushed
the combined United States and South Korean forces back to
the 38 th parallel. The war would end in a stalemate on the
38 th parallel just where it had begun. 26
On 27 July 1953, after two years of negotiations,
a United Nations sponsored armistice was signed ending the
Korean War. On 8 August 1953, the Republic of Korea and
the United States signed a mutual defense treaty. There are
two key articles to the treaty.
Article II. The parties will consult together
whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the
political independence or security of either of
the parties is threatened by external armed
attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and
mutual aid, the parties will maintain and develop
26 Richard T. Detrio, Strategic Partners: South Korea and the United
States
, (Washington: National Defense University, 1989), 6-7.
16
appropriate means to deter armed attack and will
take suitable measures in consultation and
agreement to implement this treaty and to further
its purposes.
Article IV. The Republic of Korea grants, and
the United States of America accepts, the right
to dispose United States land, air and sea forces
in and about the territory of the Republic of
Korea as determined by mutual agreement. 27
Since the end of the Korean War and the signing
of the mutual defense treaty, the United States has
maintained forward-deployed forces in Korea. Today the
United States has some 36,000 troops forward-deployed in
Korea. These forces are made up of one army division and
one wing of Air Force combat aircraft. Additionally we
have 160 tanks and 310 armored vehicles in Korea. 21
In addition to the forward-deployed forces the
United States has also given substantial economic
assistance to South Korea. For twenty years after the
signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, Korea received
approximately 8 percent of all United States foreign aid.
27 Ernest Graves, "ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation: Current Status," in
The Future of South Korean-U.S. Security Relations , eds . William J.
Taylor, Jr., Young Koo Cha, John Q. Blodgett, and Michael Mazarr
(Boulder: Westview, 1989), 15.
28 Defense White Paper , (Seoul: The Ministry of National Defense, The
Republic of Korea, 1996), 38.
17
Between 1954 and 1970, the United States gave Korea over
3.5 billion dollars in economic assistance. 29
b. Republic of Korea Defense Forces
Korea has developed a very capable military
force. As of 1996, Korea had over 650,000 troops. This
figure does not include reserve forces. Korea currently
has 2,050 tanks, 2,200 armored vehicles, 180 combatant
ships, 520 tactical aircraft and 630 helicopters. 30
American forward-deployed forces have become
less important to the defense of Korea as the capabilities
of the South Korean military have increased. In fact,
American forces have taken on a somewhat symbolic role
reflecting the United States commitment to Korea. They
have often been called a "tripwire" or "speed bump". It is
doubtful that American forward-deployed forces would play a
determining role in the outcome of war should North Korea
decide to attack.
29 Detrio, 15.
30 Defense White Paper , 71,
18
C. UNITED STATES VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN
ASIA
The United States has pursued three broad policy
objectives in Asia since the end of World War II. They are
1) freedom of the seas; 2) unimpeded access to the markets
of the region; and 3) preventing the domination of the
region by a single power or group of powers. 31
While the United States has consistently pursued these
three policy objectives, it has not given equal weight to
each. During the Cold War the primary objective was to
contain communism. The defense of South Korea was an
essential element of this policy. With the end of the Cold
War the emphasis has shifted.
Today the most important policy objectives are keeping
open access to the markets of Asia and maintaining freedom
of the seas. The non-Western countries (and Japan) of the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Group now account for
over 25 percent of the global GNP. American trade with
Asian countries continues to increase. By 1994, American
exports to Asia would amount to $153 billion dollars and
account for over 3 million American jobs. In 1994,
31 Holmes and Moore, 52.
19
American exports to Asia were $45 billion greater than
American exports to the 15 nations of the European Union. 3 '
In 1997 several economies in Asia took an unexpected
downturn. It is too early to determine how deeply rooted
the current economic crisis is and what effect it will have
on American trade in the region. However, the economic
crisis could have a profound effect on longstanding United
States security policies in Asia.
For example, American taxpayers may be unwilling to
bail out South Korea or Japan if their economies fail.
China may fill the void and view this as an opportunity to
gain influence in the region. The implications for United
States security policy could be devastating. Accordingly,
United States and South Korean security officials need to
watch the regional economic situation closely to manage its
impact on the U.S.-ROK alliance and the alliance's ability
to cope with North Korea's evolving circumstances.
1 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Security in Northeast Asia: From
Okinawa to the DMZ , hearing, 104 th Cong., 2 na sess., 17 April 1996
(Washington: GPO, 1996), 53.
20
III. DIVISION AND UNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DIVISION OF THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
The end of WWII in Asia brought with it the end of
Japanese colonial occupation in Korea. Korea was divided
in two with Soviet forces occupying the territory north of
the 38 fc parallel while American forces occupied the
territory south of the 38 th parallel. On 15 August 1948, the
pro-American Republic of Korea was formed and on 9
September 1948, the pro-Soviet Democratic Peoples Republic
of Korea emerged. 33
On 25 June 1950, the communist forces of North Korea
launched a surprise pre-dawn attack against South Korea in
an effort to unify the peninsula. 34 On 27 June 1950, the
United Nations Security Council passed enforcement
resolution 83 which recommended that members of the United
Nations furnish such assistance to South Korea as may be
33 Sung Chul Yang, The North and Southern Korean Political Systems: A
Comparative Analysis / (Boulder: Westview, 1994) 153.
John J. Metzler, Divided Dynamism: The Diplomacy of Separated Nations
Germany, Korea, China , (New York: University Press of America, 1996)
68.
21
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in the region. 35
Led by the United States, the international community
responded to the Security Council resolution. Sixteen
countries sent units to Korea to push back North Korean
forces. On 27 July 1953, an armistice was signed by the
United Nations Command with the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and North Korea. 36 By the end of the war, it was
estimated that 1.3 million South Koreans and 1.5 to 2
million North Koreans had died. 37
Ever since, Korea has been divided into two sovereign
countries. The overriding policy objective of both the
North and South Korean governments has been the unification
of Korea. This chapter will evaluate the past efforts of
both the North and South Korean governments at unification.
I will identify the reasons the unification proposals of
both North and South Korea have failed and have not




B. NORTH KOREAN UNIFICATION POLICIES
Since its founding, the primary objective of North
Korea has been the unification of Korea on its own terms.
Shortly after North Korea was formed its leaders stated
that "the South is a complete colony and a military base of
the United States, and the socio-economic structure of its
society still displays semi-feudal characteristics with no
substantial changes from those under Japanese rule." 38 This
antagonistic view towards South Korea and the United States
has been a constant theme in North Korea's policies toward
the South.
Although the original constitution of North Korea does
not specifically mention unification, the preamble to the
Korean Worker's Party clearly states that:
The immediate aim of the Workers Party of Korea
lies in guaranteeing the complete victory of
socialism in the northern half of the Republic,
and in carrying out the tasks of anti-
imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution on
a nation-wide scale... The Worker' s Party of Korea
struggles for the liberation of the southern half
of our country from American imperialist
aggressive forces and internal reactionary rule,
and for the attainment of complete unification of
37 Ibid., 154
38 Peace and Cooperation White Paper on Korean Unification , (Seoul
Ministry of National Unification, 1996), 68.
23
the country by firmly uniting the broad popular
masses of North and South Korea...39
From the start, North Korea has viewed unification as
the North taking over the South. The Northern socialist
system would be imposed on the South and the imperialist
Americans would be kicked out.
The invasion of the South Korea by North Korean forces
in 1950 was clearly an attempt to unify Korea under the
terms of North Korea. Kim II Sung expected the war to last
less than a month. He expected his forces would "reunify
our fatherland, and completely liberate the people in the
southern half from the police state tyranny of the United
States imperialists and the Syngman Rhee clique.
"
4 The end
result of the Korean War was not unification but an even
stronger divide in Korea. The Korean War would end up
being North Korea's first failed attempt at unification.
1. The 1960's
The armistice that ended the Korean War resulted in a
military stalemate along the 38 th parallel. The South has
39 Translated in Robert A Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in
Korea, Part II: The Society (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1972), p. 1332, quoted in Nicholas Eberstadt, "North Korea's




been under the constant threat of another invasion by the
North ever since. Despite some incursions into the
demilitarized zone by North Korean forces, they have not
attempted to invade the South since the end of the war.
The stalemate changed North Korea's strategy from a
military victory over the South to peaceful reunification.
In August 1960, North Korea proposed peaceful
unification of Korea through a series of transitional
stages which would result in a Confederation. The proposed
Confederation would leave the existing political systems in
the North and South intact. However, the North and South
would each appoint an equal number of delegates to a
Supreme National Congress.
The proposal was dead on arrival because North Korea
saw the confederation as a means of liberating South Korea
from the colonial rule of the United States. In other
words, the South Korean political system would eventually
be absorbed and replaced by the northern system. This was




In the early 1970' s there was a thaw in relations
between North and South Korea. South Korea was completely
taken by surprise by the Sino-United States rapprochement
in 1972. However, the Sino-United States rapprochement
encouraged North and South Korea to enter into direct
negotiations for the first time. 42
The subsequent meetings in 1972 resulted in a joint
communique which declared that the unification of Korea
should occur through:
1. independent Korean efforts without being
subject to external imposition or interference,
2. peaceful means, and
3. a greater national unity transcending
differences in ideas, ideologies and systems. 43
For the first time, hopes were raised that Korea could be
peacefully unified.
This first contact was but a brief respite in tensions
between the North and South. North and South Korea
immediately began to argue over the meaning of the word
41 Metzler, 109.
42 Young Whan Kihl, Korea and the World
, (Boulder: Westview, 1994) 134.
43 Quansheng Zhao and Robert Sutter, eds
.
, Politics of Divided Nations:
China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam- Unification, Conflict Resolution and
Political Development / Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary
Asian Studies, no. 5-1991 (106), (Baltimore: University of Maryland,
1991) 62.
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"independent" in the communique. North Korea interpreted
independent to mean that South Korea would kick out the
American forces. South Korea argued that the American
forces had been blessed by the United Nations and as such
could not be regarded as foreign. 44
On 23 June 1973, South Korea proposed dual membership
in the United Nations for North and South Korea. North
Korea was enraged and countered with a single-seat proposal
for both Koreas. 45 By 1974, North Korea would pull out of
negotiations and refuse any more high level exchanges with
South Korean officials.
On 23 June 1973, North Korea floated the proposal for
another Confederation, which would unify the North and the
South. The name of this Confederation would be the
Confederal Republic of Koryo. The selection of the name
showed insensitivity on the part of North Korea. The name
Koryo was taken from the northern Koryo Dynasty of 918-
1392. 46 The inference that could be made from the name was
that a modern northern "Dynasty" would take over and
dominate the South. The Five Point Program included:
44 Rinn-Sup Shinn, "Prospects for Change in North Korea's Policy Toward
South Korea", Korea Observer, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (Winter 1993): 462.
45 Ibid.
46 Zhao and Sutter, 108.
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1. clearance of military confrontation,
2. cooperation and exchanges in various areas,
3. convocation of a Great National Congress
4
.
formation of a Confederation and




Besides the problem with the name, there were some
other problems with the proposal. The clearance of
military confrontation certainly meant the withdrawal of
American troops from South Korea. At this stage, South
Korea could not unilaterally defend itself against North
Korea and could not consider removing American troops.
Also at this time, South Korea was seeking a seat in the
United Nations. East and West Germany had just been
granted admittance into the United Nations under two names.
South Korea was not willing to enter the United Nations
under a single name and single seat.
3. The 1980'
s
In October 1980, the Sixth Congress of the Korean
Workers Party proposed a slightly modified reunification
Peace and Cooperation White Paper on Korean Unification , 76.
28
plan. The new plan would be called the Democratic
Confederal Republic of Koryo. Like the last plan, this one
also contained proposals that were unacceptable to the
South. They were:
1. replacement of the incumbent South Korean
regime,
2. abolishment of the anticommunist and national
security laws,
3. legalization of all political parties and
social organizations, and
4. release of imprisoned democratic activists
and patriots. 48
The first proposition could be discarded at face
value. The next three propositions were all aimed at
legalizing the communist party in South Korea and releasing
all pro-Communist activists. These conditions were again
obviously unacceptable to South Korea.
4. The 1990'
s
In the 1990' s, North Korea shifted its position on
unification. In a 1991 New Year's message, Kim II Sung
stated that "unification of the fatherland should be
48 ibid.
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achieved on the principle that neither side takes over the
other or is taken over by the other and in the form of a
confederation with one people, one nation, two systems, and
two governments." 49 He devised a ten-point plan called the
Program of Great Unity for the Korean Nation. The Ninth
Supreme People's assembly subsequently adopted the plan on
7 April 1993. The plan contains the following specific
points
:
NORTH KOREA'S TEN POINT PROGRAM
1. A unified state, independent, peaceful and
neutral, should be founded through the great
unity of the whole nation.
2. Unity should be based on patriotism and the
spirit of national independence;
3. Unity should be achieved on the principle of
promoting coexistence, co-prosperity and common
interests, and subordinating everything to the
cause of national reunification;
4. All manner of political disputes that foment
division and confrontation between the fellow
countrymen should be stopped and unity achieved;
5. People should dispel fears of invasion from
either the South or the North;
6. People should join hands on the road to
national reunification, not rejecting each other
for the difference in isms and principles;
49 Ibid. 77.
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7. People should protect material and spiritual
wealth of individual persons and organizations;
8. The nation should understand, trust and unite
with one another through contacts, travels and
dialogues;
9. The Koreans in the North, the South, and
overseas should strengthen solidarity with one
another on the way to national reunification; and
10. All Koreans who have contributed to the unity
of the nation and to the cause of the national
reunification should be highly respected. 50
At first glance, the proposal was fairly benign and
palatable. It basically amounted to the peaceful
coexistence of two independent States that would be merged
at some uncertain time in the distant future. However, in
April 1993, North Korea demanded that South Korea must
first satisfy the following four pre-conditions. South
Korea must
:
1. remove itself from the United States nuclear
umbrella,
2. disengage from any joint military exercises
with foreign troops,
3. oust the United States troops from the
peninsula, and
50 North Korea News (Seoul), No. 679 (April 19, 1993), 1-2; and Korea
Report (Tokyo, Japan), No. 272 (April 1993), ("DPRK President Proposes
10-Point Policy Platform for Great Unity of Korean Nation") , 1-6 quoted
in John C. H. Oh, "Policy Alternatives for Uniting the Two Koreas",
Korea Observer, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (Winter 1993): 483.
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4 . adopt a policy of non-reliance on foreign
powers, particularly on the United States and
Japan concerning political, military, and
economic matters. 51
On the surface the ten-point program seemed to be a
major policy shift for North Korea. For the first time
North Korea was willing to accept peaceful coexistence as
the first step toward unification. The four pre-conditions
changed this perception immediately. North Korea had not
changed positions and was still calling for a total
withdrawal of American troops.
5 . Conclusion on North Korea' s Unification Policies
For obvious reasons, South Korea has not adopted any
of the North Korea's proposals for unification. The
proposals have been so unrealistic that they amount to pure
propaganda. North Korea has always insisted on the
withdrawal of American forces as a precondition for
unification. The South is not willing to risk another
invasion by the North and therefore will not remove
American forces unless there is a massive disarming in the
North. The proposals for unification from the North all
assume that a socialist system will replace the South
51 Oh, 484
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Korean system. The South Korean people will not give up
their newfound democracy without a fight. The North Korean
economy is in shambles while the South Korean economy
continues to boom (as of this writing the South Korean
economy is showing some signs of weakness) . It is
unrealistic and naive of the North to expect the South to
adopt their system.
C. SOUTH KOREAN UNIFICATION POLICIES
Unification of Korea has been a policy goal of both
North and South Korea since their inception. However,
unification has been a much greater priority for the North
than the South. While always a goal in the South, the
priority placed on unification has depended on which regime
was in power. 52
Like the North Korean government the South Korean
government also views itself as the only legitimate
government on the peninsula. Based on its interpretation
of the United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1948
which says that the South Korean government is the only
legitimate government in Korea. As such, South Korea views
33
North Korean government as an anti-state organization,
which is illegally occupying a portion of Korea. 5
The administration of Roh Tae-woo placed the highest
emphasis on unification. It was the Roh government, which
implemented the Nordpolitik policy. The Roh government
also developed the Korean National Unification Program and
negotiated the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-
Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation with North Korea.
These three policies have been the most comprehensive plans
by South Korea to unify Korea.
1 . Nordpolitik
The great success of West Germany' s Ostpolitik, or
Eastern Policy, encouraged South Korea to develop its
Northern Policy. The essential elements of Ostpolitik were
that in exchange for West Germany recognition of East
Germany' s sovereignty, Eastern European nations would
normalize relations with West Germany. German reunification
would essentially be put on the back burner and solved at a
later date.
52 B. C. Koh, "A Comparison of Unification Policies," in Korea and the
World Beyond the Cold War, ed. Young Whan Kihl (Boulder: Westview,
1994) : 153-155.
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South Korea's Foreign Minister Lee Bum-Suk first
stated the term Nordpolitik or northern policy in 1983 in a
speech. His definition of the northern policy was:
Our most important foreign policy goal in the
1980' s is to prevent the recurrence of war on the
Korean Peninsula, and our most important
diplomatic task is to pursue the northern policy
successfully which aims at normalizing relations
with the Soviet Union and China. 54
While the policy was not directly aimed at North Korea,
President Roh defined the northern policy as "I will
approach the communist block more vigorously in order to
realize peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea
and ultimately unification." 55 The principle of the
northern policy was to establish relations with the Soviet
Union and China. If the South Koreans were able to
successfully establish relations with two of North Korea's
allies it would increase stability on the peninsula.
South Korea also hoped that North Korea would come to
appreciate the economic benefits that China and the Soviet
53 Kim Hak-joon, "Korean Reunification: A Seoul Perspective," in Korea
under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter- Korean
Relations , ed. James Cotton (Canberra: ANU Printery, 1993) 278-279.
b4 Lee Bum-Suk, Sonj in Choguk reul wihan Oegyo (Diplomacy for the
Creation of the Advanced Fatherland) , a speech delivered at the
National Defense University, 29 June 1983, quoted in Sang-Seek Park,
"Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations," in Korea Under Roh
Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations ,
ed. James Cotton (Canberra: ANU Printery, 1993), 218.
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Union had realized by opening to the west. If North Korea
did appreciate the benefits, then maybe North Korea would
start to open up also. Hopefully this opening up process
would ultimately bring North Korea into relationships with
"normal nations" and increase stability on the peninsula. 56
The northern policy has been extremely successful for
South Korea. As a result of the policy, South Korea
established diplomatic relations with Hungary and Poland in
1989, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania
and Mongolia in 1990 and the PRC in 1992. 57
While the northern policy was an unqualified success
for South Korea, it is hard to determine if it had any
effect on the stability of the peninsula. If it had any
effect on North Korea it was to isolate them even more.
South Korea is now on friendly terms with North Korea's
former allies.
55 Roh Tae-woo, Widae han Botong Saram eu Sidae (Era of the Great Common
Man) (Seoul: Eulyu Munhwasa, 1987), 229, quoted in Sang-Seek Park, 218.
bb Kim Kook-chin, "Seoul's Nordpolitik," in Korea 1991 The Road to
Peace , eds . Michael J. Mazarr, John Q. Blodgett, Cha Young-koo, and
William J. Taylor, Jr. (Boulder: Westview, 1991) 95.
57 Kim Hak-joon, "The Republic of Korea's Northern Policy: Origin
Development, and Prospects," in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo:
Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter Korean Relations , ed. James




Korean National Unification Program
The Roh plan for unification is a step by step merging
of the political systems of the North and South, which will
ultimately result in unification. Roh said, "The Korean
people are one, a unified Korea must be a single nation.
No system for bringing the two parts of Korea together will
accomplish genuine unification so long as it aims at
perpetuating two states with differing ideologies,
"
58 This
statement is clearly aimed at North Korea's proposals for
unification. Roh saw his plan as achieving a unified Korea
while North Korea's plans would just perpetuate coexistence
of two separate systems. Roh unveiled the Korean National
Unification plan before the National assembly on 11
September 1989. 59
The plan consists of four stages, which would
eventually lead to unification. During the first stage
mutual confidence would be built through increased inter-
Korean dialogue. A North-South summit would be convened to
adopt a National Community Charter. The charter would
contain "a comprehensive package of agreements covering a
basic formula for attaining peace and unification, mutual
58 Metzler, 84
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non-aggression arrangements, and the founding of the Korean
Commonwealth as an interim stage toward unification."
During the second stage, a Korean Commonwealth would
be created. The Korean Commonwealth would integrate the
two parts of Korea and create a common bond among Koreans.
The increased economic, cultural and social ties would
merge the Korean people into a homogenous group. This
would lead to the third stage. 61
The Korean Commonwealth would also have a legislative
body consisting of:
1. A Council of Representatives consisting of 100
members with equal numbers representing the North
and South;
2. Joint Secretariat which would provide
logistics support to the Council of Ministers
and the Council of Representatives;
3. Council of Presidents consisting of chief
executives from the North and South;
4
.
Council of Ministers chaired by the Prime
Ministers of both the North and South. The




59 Young Whan Kihl, "The Problem of Forming a Korean Commonwealth,"
Korea Observer, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (Autumn 1993): 430-431.
60 To Build a National Community through the Korean Commonwealth A
Blueprint For Korean Unification / (Seoul: National Unification Board
Republic of Korea, 1989) 14
61 Ibid.
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The proposed agenda for the Council of Ministers would
be:
a) The issue of reuniting dispersed families,
whose members are estimated to total 10 million;
b) The easing of political confrontation between
the North and South;
c) The prevention of costly and counterproductive
inter-Korean rivalry on the world scene and the
joint promotion of national interests including
the interests of overseas Koreans;
d) The opening of both North and South Korean
societies and the promotion of multi-faceted
inter-Korean exchanges, trade and cooperation;
e) The fostering of a national culture;
f) The formation of a common economic zone to
achieve a common prosperity;
g) The building of military confidence and
implementation of arms control; and
h) The replacement of the current Armistice
63Agreement with a peace agreement.
During the fourth stage, a Council of Representatives
would draft a constitution through democratic methods and
procedures. The constitution would be used to merge the




free general election to select a unified legislature and a
unified government. 64
From the North Korean perspective there are three
major flaws with the proposal. The first is that South
Korea claims the proposal is keeping in spirit with the
joint communique of 1972. The major stumbling block in the
joint communique was the interpretation of the word
independent. In the Commonwealth proposal South Korea
spells out that "independent" does not mean that South
Korea will have to cut off all ties with its traditional
friends. 65
According to this interpretation, American forces
would not have to be withdrawn. The withdrawal of American
forces has been a constant theme and pre-condition for all
of North Korea's proposals for unification. North Korea
will not accept the proposal unless this pre-condition is
met
.
The second flaw is that the proposal calls for free
elections to select a unified government. The election
would be one man one vote. Since South Korea's population





probably result in a pro-South government and a certain
demise of the North Korean regime.
While North Korea has strongly supported unification
since Korea was split in two, it has always expected that
the North would consume the South. Free elections would not
allow this to happen.
Finally, the proposal calls for replacing the
Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty negotiated between
the North and South. North Korea does not see the South as
a signatory to the original Armistice and as such the South
has no right to enter into negotiations to replace it.
While the South Korean proposal for unification may
seem more reasonable than North Korea's proposals to the
neutral observer at first glance, it is not acceptable to
North Korea. If North Korea adopted the proposal it would
result in the imposition of the South Korean system on
North Korea. For this reason, the present regime in North
Korea can never give it serious consideration.
3. Unification Efforts Under -the Kim Young Sam
Administration
Early in his term, President Kim Young Sam took an
active approach towards North Korea. He proposed summit
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meetings that had already been agreed to under the Basic
Agreement. His initial efforts to establish contact were
rebuffed by North Korea, so he decided to wait and let
North Korea initiate talks. During negotiations with
former President Jimmy Carter over North Korea' s nuclear
program, Kim II Sung supposedly agreed to a summit meeting
with President Kim Young Sam. However, Kim II Sung died of
a heart attack before the meeting took place. Kim II Sung'
s
66death brought President Kim's efforts to a temporary halt.
Since Kim II Sung's death in 1994, relations between
North and South Korea have been strained. South Korea has
delivered limited food aid to North Korea in hopes of
reopening a discussion. On 16 April 1996, President Kim
invited North Korea to enter into four way talks to settle
the armistice which ended the Korean War. The participants
would be the United States, the PRC, and North and South
Korea. Although preliminary meetings to discuss the four
way talks have taken place little progress has been made.
At the most recent set of meetings (as of this writing) on
18 and 19 September 1997, North Korea insisted that before
66 Young-Shik Kim, "South Korea-U.S. Relations and North Korea," Korea
and World Affairs Vol. XX, No. 3 (Fall 1996): 487.
67 Seongwhun Cheon, "The Four-Party Peace Meeting Proposal," Korea and
World Affairs Vol. XX No. 2 (Summer 1996): 168.
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another meeting could take place, there must first be a
deal to withdraw American troops from South Korea. 68 On, 21
November 1997, North Korea dropped its preconditions and
agreed to attend four party talks in Geneva in December
1997.
Despite President Kim's best efforts, he like his
predecessors has had limited success in bringing North
Korea to the bargaining table to begin discussions to unify
Korea. North Korea continues to set the unrealistic pre-
condition that American troops must first leave South
Korea. Understandably, South Korea will continue to refuse
this pre-condition.
D. BASIC AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NON-AGGRESSION AND
EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION (BASIC AGREEMENT)
The Basic Agreement is not a unification policy of the
ROK but instead is a by-product of the inter-Korean peace
process. If implemented, it will lead to peaceful
coexistence between the South and North. As such, I have
incorporated it into this chapter to provide background for
subsequent sections.
68 Keith B. Richburg, "North Korea On Brink of New Crisis," The
Washington Post, 18 October 1997, Al
.
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The Basic Agreement was negotiated between North and
South Korea during eight sessions in 1990 and 1991.
Negotiations concluded with the signature of the document
by representatives of North and South Korea on 13 December
1991. 69
The Basic Agreement is divided into four chapters and
contains twenty-eight articles. Chapter one deals with
South-North reconciliation, chapter two deals with South-
North non-aggression, chapter three deals with South-North
exchanges and chapter four deals with amendments and
effectuation. 70
Chapter one spells out the peaceful coexistence
between the North and South. Articles include:




no interference in each others internal
affairs,
3. the two sides shall not slander or vilify
each other,
4. no actions of sabotage,
5. both sides should endeavor to replace the
Armistice with a peace treaty,
69 Han-Kyo Kim, "Reconciliation and Cooperation between the Two Koreas
in the Era of Globalization," Korea Observer, Vol. XXV No.
4
(Winter 1994) 450.
70 Kihl, Appendix B.
44
6. the two sides shall not compete against each
other in the international arena,
7. establish liaison offices in Panmunjon three
months following the signing of the
agreement, and
8. establish high level talks to discuss
implementation of the agreement.
Chapter II spells out non-aggression between the two sides
and includes:
9. commitment not to use force against each
other,
10. differences will be resolved peacefully,
11. military Demarcation line will be respected,
12. joint South-North Military Commission will be
established,
13. establish a telephone hot line, and
14. a joint Military Committee will be
established to ensure the implementation of the
agreement
.
Chapter III spells out exchange and cooperation
and includes:
15. the two sides shall engage economic exchange
including joint ventures,
16. exchanges in technology, education, literature
etc.
,
17. promote intra-Korean travel,
45
18. free correspondence between the people in both
Koreas,
19. reconnect railroads, and
20. link telephones and postal service. 71
The signing of the treaty brought great hope that the
two sides would finally be able to coexist. The
establishment of the liaison office was most important, as
it would encourage dialogue between the two sides.
However, the agreement was never implemented and North and
South are as isolated from one and another as they have
ever been.
E . CONCLUSION
The unification efforts of both North and South Korea
have failed so far because their political and economic
systems are diametrically opposed. Both profess to want
unification but each side insists on unification under its
own terms. The only way to truly unify Korea is under one
system or the other. Neither side is willing to give up
their own system so real unification cannot occur until one
side concedes or collapses.
71 ibid.
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Under the current situation, the best that can be
hoped for is peaceful coexistence. If implemented, the
Basic Agreement would enable the North and South to
peacefully coexist. However it has yet to be implemented




IV. FACTORS INDICATING POSSIBLE
COLLAPSE OF NORTH KOREA
A. CURRENT CRISIS IN NORTH KOREA
Since its founding, North Korea has been one of the
most closed and isolated countries the world has ever
known. As such, foreign observers and analysts have had a
difficult time in accurately assessing internal conditions
in North Korea. Despite this difficulty, several factors
that can be independently verified now merge to paint a
bleak picture of conditions within North Korea. These
factors are North Korea's political isolation from the rest
of the world, a failing economy, the ongoing food
shortages, and ever-increasing numbers of high level
defectors. In this chapter, I will carefully look at each
of these factors and determine if they have had an effect
on North Korea's stability.
Due to these conditions, many Korea experts and
regional security specialists now speculate that North
Korea is on the verge of both economic and political
collapse. For example, in congressional testimony on 15
March 1996, General Gary Luck, the commander of U.S. and
United Nations forces in Korea said that, "the question is
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not will this country disintegrate but rather how will it
disintegrate, by implosion or explosion, and when." 7 ' Also
in congressional testimony on 17 April 1996, Dr. Marvin
Ott, a professor at the National War College in Washington
D.C., stated that "the nearly five decade contest for
supremacy between the two Korean states is over. There can




On 11 December 1996, while testifying before the
Senate Intelligence Committee the outgoing directory of the
Central Intelligence Agency, John Deutch, said that "within
the next two or three years, North Korea will either make
war, make peace, or implode." 74 His analysis is obviously
based on highly classified U.S. intelligence.
Many other scholars share these views. 75 The central
question revolves around how, and not if, North Korea will
collapse. 76 The purpose of this chapter is not to determine
72 Bill Gertz, "Pyongyang's Collapse * inevitable, '" The Washington
Times, 25 March 1996, 17.
3 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Security in Northeast Asia: From
Okinawa to the DMZ , hearing, 104 th Cong., 2 nd sess., 17 April 1996
(Washington: GPO, 1996), 83.
74
"Korea's Twin Crisis", The Economist, February 22 nd - 28 th 1997, 45.
75 For example, see Nicholas Eberstadt, "Hastening Korean Unification,"
Foreign Affairs (March/April 1997) : 77-92 and Ki-hwan Kim, "North Korea
at the Critical Crossroads," Korea Focus on Current Topics Vol. 5, No.
3 (May-June 1997): 1-14.
76 Contrasting viewpoints are assessed in chapter IV.
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when North Korea will collapse. I will however look at each
of the factors that has led to such great instability in
North Korea and try determine if North Korea really is ripe
for collapse.
B. NORTH KOREA'S INCREASING INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION
North Korea has been extremely isolated from much of
the world, particularly the Western world, since its
establishment in 1948. North Korea has therefore relied
heavily on the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the
former Soviet Block for much of its international support.
This traditional support system has largely vanished
because of the unqualified success of South Korea's
Northern Policy and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet
Union.
1 . Soviet Union/Russia
South Korea's Northern Policy was aimed at
establishing diplomatic relations with the communist block
in order to increase stability on the Korean Peninsula. It
would begin to bear fruit with the normalization of
relations with Hungary in 1989 and culminated with the
normalization of relations with all of Eastern Europe by
51
the end of 1991. Additionally, South Korea normalized
relations with the Soviet Union on 30 September 1990. This
was a severe blow to North Korea. 77
The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Block in 1991
was also a great blow to North Korea. As a result of the
Soviet collapse, North Korea not only lost one of its
largest benefactors but also lost one of its few political
supporters in the international community. Following the
Soviet collapse, relations between Russia and North Korea
continued to deteriorate. In February 1993, Russia sent a
delegation to North Korea headed by Deputy Foreign Minister
George Kunadze. Although unsuccessful, his mission was to
renegotiate the cornerstone of the Soviet-North Korea 1961
Friendship Treaty, by removing the military assistance
clause. North Korea's refusal to negotiating an end to the
78
military clause led Russia to unilaterally scrap it.
In September 1995, Russia advised North Korea that it
did not intend to extend the 1961 treaty on friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance which included the
military assistance clause. The treaty expired on 10
7 North Korea The Foundations for Military Strength (Washington:
Defense Intelligence Agency, 1996), 3.
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"Asia 1994 Yearbook A Review Of The Events Of 1993," Far Eastern
Economic Review, (1995) : 149.
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September 1995. It is doubtful in 1997 that Russia would
come to the aid of North Korea in any military conflict. 7
2. People's Republic of China (PRC)
As a result of South Korea's Northern Policy, the PRC
restored diplomatic relations with South Korea on 24 August
1990. Since diplomatic relations have been restored, the
PRC has enthusiastically promoted South Korean investments
in, and technology transfers to, the PRC. The new
relationship between North Korea's last major supporter and
its arch-rival was undoubtedly a severe blow to North
Korea. Although the PRC restored relations with South
Korea, it did not abrogate the Sino-DPRK Friendship
Treaty's military clause. 80
One measure of the value the PRC places on its new
relations with South Korea was seen during the crisis
surrounding the Hwang Jang-yop defection. On 12 February
1997, Hwang Jong-yop one of the leading members of
Pyongyang' s ruling circle sought asylum at the South Korean
Embassy in Beijing. North Korea strongly objected and
79
"Asia 1996 Yearbook A Review Of The Events Of 1995," Far Eastern
Economic Review, (1997): 150.
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sought his return. The PRC was caught in a diplomatic
quandary and was forced to choose sides. The PRC had to
decide whether it would support its long time ally North
Korea or support its newfound trading partner South Korea.
In 1996, trade between the PRC and South Korea topped $19.9
billion while trade between the PRC and North Korea would
amount to only $566 million. 81
To North Korea's surprise, the PRC was unwilling to
risk its trade with South Korea, and turned a blind eye to
ideology and its former ally. The PRC sided with South
Korea. In an effort to allow North Korea to save some face,
the PRC insisted that Hwang would not be allowed to go
directly to South Korea but instead would first have to go
to a third country. Despite this translucent effort to
allow North Korea to save face, the damage had been done. '
C. NORTH KOREA'S FAILING ECONOMY
Because of the closed nature of North Korea, it is
difficult to determine precise economic statistics. The
economic statistics produced by the Bank of Korea (in South
80 Paul H. Kreisberg, "Threat Environment for a United Korea", The
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. VIII No. 1 (Summer 1996) : 81-
82.
81 Amy Woo, "East Asia: China Treads Korean Tightrope," International
Press Service English News Wire, 3 March 1997.
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Korea) are considered to be the most accurate and are
widely quoted in the press and scholarly journals. If
these figures are to be believed, North Korea has
registered a consistent negative annual growth in GDP every
year since 1990. There are two primary reasons for this
trend. They are the failure of Juche ideology and the
collapse of the Soviet Block. Each has had a profound
effect on North Korea's failing economy.
1 . Juche Ideology
One cannot begin to discuss North Korea's socialist
command economy without first having a clear understanding
of the Juche system or ideology. Juche ideology was best
described by Kim II Sung as:
Being the master of revolution and construction
in one's own country. This means holding fast to
an independent position, rejecting dependence on
others, using one's own brains, believing in
one's own strength, displaying the revolutionary
spirit of self-reliance and thus solving one's
own problems for oneself on one's own
responsibility under all circumstances. 83
While many factors have contributed to North Korea's
current economic crisis, the impact of Juche ideology
82 Yong-ho Kim, "Hwang Jang-yop: His Defection and Its Impact on North
Korea", Korea Focus Vol. 5, No. 2 (March-April 1997) : 37-40.
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cannot be overstressed. Juche ideology led to direct party
management of production. Juche was responsible for short-
term economic gains but has not been able to produce long
term gains. Like many other socialist countries, North
Korea's leaders mistakenly emphasized heavy industry over
light industry and the production of consumer goods. In
accordance with Juche ideology, North Korea did not place
much emphasis on gaining western foreign investment and
technology transfers. As a result, North Korea's factories
are inefficient and much of its technology is outdated.
North Korean products cannot compete on the world free
market. 84
2 . Collapse of the Soviet Bloc
North Korea's economy was intrinsically entwined with
the economy of the Soviet Bloc. The Soviet Bloc, through
favorable trade agreements largely subsidized North Korea's
economy. North Korea came to rely on barter trade with
nations in the Soviet Bloc. The main barter/export
commodities were steel, steel products, cement, non-ferrous
3 Quoted in Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea
,
(New
York: Praeger, 1975) 52-53.
56
metals, clinker for furnace bricks, with minor exports of
marine products and fruit. In exchange, North Korea
imported food grains, petroleum and fertilizers. In 1990,
the Soviet Union began to end the barter system and
insisted on hard currency for its exports. The end of
barter trade was a severe blow to North Korea's economy. 85
Under the barter system, North Korea was allowed to
maintain consistent negative trade imbalances. The Soviets
tired of this de facto aid to North Korea. The hard
currency requirement had a dramatic negative effect on
North Korea's foreign trade. It is no coincidence that
North Korea began to register negative growth rates when
the favorable trade agreements with the Soviet Bloc ended.
Figure 1 illustrates what effect the change in Soviet
policy had on North Korea's trade.
84 Barry K. Gills, Prospects for Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia:
The Korean Conflict
,
(London: The Research Institute for the Study of
Conflict and Terrorism, 1995): 8.
85 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, U.S. -North Korean Relations: From
the Agreed Framework to Food Aid , hear:
March 1996 (Washington: GPO, 1996), 72
ing, 104 th Cong., 2 nd sess. , 19
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North Korea's direct imports from the Soviet Union
also suffered as a result of the new policy. In 1990,
North Korea imported just over $1.7 billion dollars from
the Soviet Union. By 1991 , Soviet imports would be reduced
by over 70 percent and would drop to $600 million. Today,
imports from Russia are less than ten percent of the 1987-
90 averages. 87
8 6 Young-Ho Park, "political Change in North Korea: Is There Any
Possibility for System Transformation?," The Korean Journal for Defense
Ananlysis Vol. VII No. 2 (Winter 1995) : 226.
' William J. Taylor Jr. and Abraham Kim, "Korean Security in an
Insecure Post-Cold War Era," in Change and Challenge on the Korean
Peninsula: Developments, Trends and Issues , eds
.
, Jae H. Ku and Tae
Hwan Ok (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 1996), 36.
58
Figure 2 depicts the trend in trade between North
Korea and Russia/CIS countries between 1988 and 1994.
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Source: National Unification Board
One of the key Soviet exports to North Korea was crude
oil. When the Soviet Union began to insist on hard
currency in exchange for crude oil, North Korea was unable
to pay for it. Hence, crude oil imports from the Soviet
Union which amounted to 800,000 tons in 1991 would drop to
30,000 tons by 1992. North Korea's other main supplier of
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crude oil, the PRC, also began to insist that payment be
made in hard currency in 1992. The PRC also raised the
subsidized price they had been charging North Korea to near
international market prices. As a result, a severe energy
crisis developed in North Korea. Many factories are now
estimated to be working at less than half of capacity due
to a shortage of energy and raw materials. The end of the
Soviet support system profoundly effected the North Korean
89economy.
3 . Economic Trends in North Korea
Largely due to Juche ideology and the collapse of the
Soviet Block, North Korea has experienced negative GDP
growth every year since 1990. Figure 3 depicts this trend.
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D. FOOD SHORTAGE
Due to geographic constraints, less than 20 percent of
the land in North Korea is arable. As a result, North
Korea has a difficult time in producing enough food for its
population even if weather conditions are perfect. Massive
flooding in 1995 followed by drought in 1996 has left North
Korea with a serious food shortage. Although it is easy to
90 Jae Hoon Shim, "Darkness at Noon," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10
October 1996, 30.
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blame the current food crisis on poor weather and bad luck,
many other factors have also contributed to North Korea's
agricultural problems. Among them are shortages of
fertilizer, fuel, and hard currency to purchase food from
other countries.
1 . The Current Food Crisis
On August 4, 1997 the United Nations World Food
Program and other relief charities reported that the
current drought in North Korea has destroyed up to 70
percent of this year's maize crop. If these figures are
correct, North Korea will need to import 1.5 million tons
of maize this year to feed its population. Due to its
failing economy, North Korea is short on foreign hard
currency and is unable to purchase the required food
imports on the world market. 91
In order to prevent mass starvation, the once proud
North Korean government that is based on Juche ideology has
been forced to beg for international aid. Since 1995 when
North Korea first began to request aid, it has received
over 320,000 metric tons of food aid from the United
Nations World Food Program. The United Nations World Food
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Program estimates that North Korea has also received
another $115.6 million in food aid from the PRC, other
nations and non-governmental organizations. 92
If foreign sources of international aid dry up, North
Korea will face an enormous humanitarian crisis. Large
portions of the population will be in danger of starving.
It is impossible to predict how the North Korean people
would react to such a situation. However, it is hard to
imagine that the citizens would idly stand by as their
government slowly starves them.
2 . Long-term Prospects
North Korea faces a serious challenge if it decides to
solve its long-term food problems. Fundamental changes in
the economy and the agricultural sector will have to made.
Although North Korea can increase the amount of arable land
through tidal reclamation programs and terracing hillsides,
these programs would be very expensive. If the North
Korean population continues to grow, North Korea will have
to increase the amount of food it imports or receives as
aid.
91
"The Horrors of North Korea," The Economist, 9 Aug. 1997, 34
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The only way for North Korea to increase food imports
is to increase its foreign currency reserves or find a
country that is willing to barter goods for food. In order
to increase foreign currency reserves North Korea must
increase its foreign trade or procure foreign investment
capital to rebuild its industrial base and modernize
obsolete factories. North Korea also needs to increase
fertilizer and oil imports in order to increase food
production.
North Korea has made some attempts to secure foreign
investment by establishing a free-trade zone called Rajin-
Sonbong. To lure foreign investors, North Korea would allow
fully foreign-owned enterprises, a five-year tax holiday
and a 14 percent corporate income tax rate. Foreigners
would also be able to enter the zone without visas. 9
Although there has been limited interest by some foreign
companies, most have been turned off because of a lack of
infrastructure such as roads, electricity and water
supply. 94
92 Keith B. Richburg, "Beyond a Wall of Secrecy, Devastation," The
Washington Post, 19 Oct. 1997, A23.
93 Selig B. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," Foreign
Policy (Spring 1997): 64.
94 Shim, 26.
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Another way for North Korea to increase agricultural
productivity would be to follow the Chinese agricultural
reform model. In the late 1970s, Chinese planners realized
that their agricultural policies were not working. Their
solution was to de-collectivize agriculture and institute a
contract system. Under this system, contracts were made
between production teams and individual households.
Farmers were allowed to keep the surplus production and
dispose of it as they desired. They could save it for
themselves, sell it to the government or sell it on the
market. The new policy effectively increased the incentive
for the individual farmer to increase production. The
policy resulted in a massive increase in production in the
1980s. Rural production in the 1980s increased by 250
percent. 95 To date, North Korea's leaders have refused to
implement the Chinese model.
E . DEFECTIONS
In 1996, the number of defectors from North to South
Korea was reported to be 51. When compared with the 38 who
defected in 1995, it seems like a large increase. However
95 John King Fairbank, China a New History , (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992) , 411-12
.
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in 1994, 50 people defected from North to South. Although
the numbers for 1997 are not in yet, there has been a
change in the pattern of defections. What was surprising
in 1997 was that defectors come from the ruling class of
North Korea. 96
On 12 February 1997, North Korea was stunned when
Hwang Jang-Yop walked into the South Korean Embassy in
Beijing and requested asylum. Hwang was the architect of
Juche ideology and was a long-standing member of the ruling
circle in North Korea. Although his stature in the party
had decreased since the death of Kim II Sung, Hwang was the
international affairs secretary of the North Korean Workers
Party. 97
On 26 August 1997, North Korea was again stung by two
high level defectors. Chang Song Gil, North Korea's
ambassador to Egypt and his brother, Chang Sung Ho, a
commercial counselor at the North Korean mission in Paris,
both defected to the United States. The ambassador is the
highest level diplomat to ever defect and is thought to
have important information about North Korean weapons sales
to countries in the Middle East. Additionally, Chang Sung
96 B. C. Koh, "South Korea in 1996 Internal Strains and External
Challenges," Asian Survey Vol . XXXVII, No. 1 (Jan 1997): 14.
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Ho's wife, who also defected, is considered to be a close
personal friend of Kim Jong II. 98
Although it could be easy to misinterpret the meaning
of the defections, one point is clear. These defections
indicate that leaders of the ruling party do not totally
support Kim Jong II and are another indication that
conditions in North Korea are unstable.
F. CONCLUSION
Most scholars and regional security analysts agree
that North Korea appears to be caught in a death spiral.
Unless fundamental reforms are made and North Korea opens
up to the rest of the world, the death spiral will
continue. Without reforms, the death spiral will end in
either a soft or hard landing unless it first implodes.
The final outcome is up to Kim II Sung and the rest of
North Korea's leaders.
There are however a few scholars who disagree with
this view and predict that North Korea will survive the
current crisis. In the next chapter, I will take a brief
look at this argument.
97 Young-ho Kim, 37-8.
98 Norman Kemps ter, "U.S. Accepts 2 Defecting N. Korean Diplomats," Los




V. NORTH KOREA WILL SURVIVE
A. TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
Those who study and analyze the meaning of the current
crisis in North Korea tend to divide themselves into two
schools of thought. The first school of thought argues that
North Korea cannot get through the current crisis and is
doomed to collapse." While those in the first school may
disagree on the timetable and scenarios under which North
Korea will collapse, they do not diverge on the central
premise. That is, North Korea's economic and political
system cannot survive the current crisis and unification of
the peninsula under the leadership of Seoul is a forgone
conclusion. Their argument was outlined in the last
chapter.
The second school of thought (the minority view)
acknowledges that North Korea is currently in crisis but
argues that it will somehow be able to manage the crisis
and emerge as an intact nation. 100 In this chapter I will
For example see Selig B. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in
Korea," Foreign Policy 106 (Spring 1997): 57-75 and Edward A. Olsen,
"Coping with the Korean Peace Process: An American View," The Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. IX, No. 1 (Summer 1997): 159-180
100 For example see, Young-dae Song, "Changes in North Korea and How to
Respond," Korea Focus Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 1997): 22-32 and Marcus
Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through, " Foreign Affairs
(July/August 1997) : 105-118
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analyze the argument that North Korea can muddle through
the current crisis.
B. NORTH KOREA WILL MUDDLE THROUGH
In his article "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,"
Marcus Noland argues that North Korea will survive its
current crisis. In this section I will outline and analyze
each element of his argument.
1 . Economy
While Noland concedes that the North Korean economy is
shrinking, he argues that foreign observers may have
overestimated the amount it has shrunk. The most reliable
and widely quoted estimates of the North Korean economy are
those produced by the Bank of Korea (in South Korea) .
Noland argues that these estimates are based on classified
data produced by South Korean intelligence. Hence, there
is no way to verify independently the accuracy of the
figures
.
Noland may be correct. The Bank of Korea estimates of
the North Korean economy could be way off the mark.
However, while one could bicker about the accuracy of these
figures, the overall economic trend in North Korea is
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clear. The trend can be accurately verified by looking at
North Korea's trade figures with two of its largest trading
partners, Russia/CIS and the PRC. The trend indicates that
the North Korean economy has steadily declined since 1990.
Noland also argues that, "the estimated fall in
national income may well overstate the reduction in
household welfare, since it is unlikely that such services
as housing and education, which are undercounted in the
socialist accounting system and are not amenable to
physical measurement, have declined as much as manufactured
output. These estimates of national income are therefor
not necessarily indexes of hardship or political
discontent." 101
Noland implies that as long as the housing and
education needs of the people are being met then there will
be no hardship or political unrest. According to Maslow's
Hierarchy of Needs, housing and food are two of the basic
needs. If basic needs are not being met (which they
clearly are not due to the food shortages) it is unlikely
that the population is very concerned with education.
Maslow says, "For the man who is extremely and dangerously
101 Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through, " Foreign Affairs
(July/August 1997): 107.
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hungry, no other interests exist before food. He dreams
food, he remembers food, he thinks about food, he emotes
only about food, he perceives only food, and he wants only
1 02food." One sure measure of discontent is whether or not
you have enough to eat.
2 . Food Shortages
A variety of international organizations have studied
North Korea's food shortages. Most organizations agree
that North Korea's annual grain shortage amounts to two
million tons. 10 Noland does not dispute this figure.
Noland also agrees with the general assessment that the
central planning mechanism and the public food distribution
systems are fraying under pressure. But he says that we
must be careful not to overstate the importance of these
indications. Noland suggests that starvation may be fairly
localized and falling disproportionately on certain
socioeconomic groups, particularly rural nonfarm workers.
Noland also argues that North Korea could subsist with no
Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation And Personality , 2 nd ed. (New York:
Harper and Row, 1970), 36.
103 For example see Gye-dong Kim, "Kim Jong-il Regimes External
Relations," Korea Focus Vol. 3, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1995): 39-59 and Dong
Bok Lee, "An Overview of ROK-DPRK Relations 1995," in Change and
Challenge on the Korean Peninsula: Developments, Trends, and Issues .
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or relatively modest external assistance despite the two
million annual shortage in grain. However, he offers no
evidence to support his position. 104
Noland argues that food shortages are localized and
primarily occurring in the countryside. However,
foreigners who have recently returned from North Korea
report that food shortages are now spreading to Pyongyang.
For example, Caroll Bogert, a reporter for Newsweek
magazine, visited Pyongyang in September 1997. She reported
that the director of the Pyongyang City Orphanage, told her
that, "sometimes it is difficult for us to provide the
children with food." 105 United States Representative Tony P.
Hall visited North Korea for three days in August 1996. In
congressional testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
East Asian and Pacific Affairs on 12 September 1996 he
reported that during his visit "he saw a lot of individual
soldiers throughout the capital and countryside. They have
the same hollow-checked look as civilians, and their
uniforms hang very loosely on them." 106
eds . Jae H. Ku and Tae Hwan Ok (Washington: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1996), 1-15.
104 Noland., 109.
105 Carrol Bogert, "Secrets and Lies," Newsweek, 22 Sep. 1997, 42.
106 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, North Korea: An Overview , hearing,
104 th congress., 2 nd sess., 12 Sep. 1996 (Washington: GPO, 1996), 2-5.
73
These first hand accounts by independent observers
tend to refute Noland' s argument that food shortages are
localized and contained to the countryside. These accounts
clearly indicate that food shortages are becoming more
pervasive and are spreading from the countryside to the
cities
.
Noland also contends that the PRC, Japan or South
Korea has the capability to keep North Korea afloat during
the current crisis. He says, "Both Japan and China appear
to have surplus government grain stocks that could
(emphasis added) make up the North Korean shortfall at
minimal expense." While this statement is probably true,
it ignores the fact that to date Japan and China have not
been willing to give North Korea this amount of support.
There is nothing to indicate that they will anytime in the
near future. Also, Noland offers no long-term solution to
the food crisis. In order to survive, North Korea must
solve its long-term problems.
C . CONCLUSION
The argument that North Korea will emerge intact from
its current crisis is not very strong and is well supported
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by facts. Those who argue that North Korea will collapse
due to the current crisis make a much stronger argument.
North Korea is likely to collapse due to its political
isolation, a failing economy, ongoing food shortages and an
ever-increasing number of high level defectors. In the








If North Korea does collapse it is likely to happen
under one of the following three scenarios. North Korea
will explode (hard landing) , unify with South Korea through
mutual negotiations (soft landing), or implode. In this
chapter I will look at each of these scenarios from both
the North and South Korean perspectives. Each scenario
ultimately leads to the unification of the Korean
Peninsula. However, if North Korea is to have a say in how
the peninsula is unified it must pursue the soft landing.
Under the other scenarios South Korea will dictate the
terms of unification.
B. EXPLOSION SCENARIO
The rationale behind the explosion scenario is that if
the. current economic trends continue, North Korea's
leadership eventually will realize they are on the verge of
collapse. With no options remaining, the leadership would
launch a surprise attack against South Korea. The goal of
the attack may not be total victory against the South.
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Instead, North Korea would hope to seize a large portion of
South Korea and then sue for peace on its own terms, which
would include a mass infusion of economic aid. Hwang Jong-
yop, upon defecting to South Korea said that the North,
"seems to believe its only choice is to use military forces
1 Oftit has been preparing for decades.
"
At first glance, the decision to invade the South may
appear to be highly unlikely and irrational. However, this
move by North Korea would be no more irrational than Saddam
Hussein' s decision to invade and subsequently withdraw from
Kuwait. In 1997, six years after he lost the Gulf War,
Saddam remains in power. North Korean leadership has
demonstrated time and again that they are not necessarily
prone to Western definitions of rational behavior. From
North Korea's perspective, this scenario may be its only
option and could result in several benefits.
1 . North Korea : Pros and Cons of Explosion
North Korea could expect to gain several benefits from
launching an attack on South Korea. What could North Korea
expect to gain from an attack on South Korea?
108 Quoted in, Bernard E. Trainor, "A Second Korean War?," Marine Corps
Gazette (Aug. 1997): 26-7.
78
1. The main benefit North Korea could hope to attain
by attacking South Korea is the potential to sue for
peace on their terms. This could include dictating
the terms for unification in exchange for ending
hostilities. It could also include mass infusions of
foreign aid in order to ease the current economic
crisis
.
2. North Korea could also attack the South in the
mistaken belief that it could actually win the war.
With most of its million man army already deployed on
the DMZ, North Korea could launch a surprise attack on
the South and make a rapid advance. North Korea would
hope to win the war before South Korean and American
forces could assemble the reserve forces needed to
counter attack.
3. North Korea could hope to use the war as a domestic
rallying point for its starving population.
This would not be the first time a beleaguered leader
has used this tactic. 109
4
.
North Korea could start a war in hopes that the PRC
or Russia would come to their aid and enter on their
109 For example, Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands and Iraq's
invasions of Iran and Kuwait.
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side. If the PRC or Russia did enter the war, North
Korea would expect large amounts of military and
economic assistance.
5. North Korea could also enter the war with the
expectation that the U.S. would not enter the war.
Despite the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea, the
U.S. Congress or the American people may not support
sending troops to fight in Korea.
6. By attacking the South, North Korea could also hope
to drive a wedge into the U.S. -Japan relationship.
This would occur if Japan declined to support U.S.
forces in a Korean war or if Japan did not allow the
U.S. to use its bases in Japan to support a war on the
peninsula.
7. Finally, the Masada complex could motivate North
Korean leadership. North Korean leaders could
determine that if they are going down, they might as
well take South Korea with them. 110
I have listed some of the pros of the explosion
scenario from the North Korean perspective. There would
also be some serious risks from an attack on South Korea.
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What are the possible cons of the explosion scenario from a
North Korean perspective?
1. An attack on the South would almost certainly
result in a response from the combined forces of South
Korea and the U.S. Although North Korea could make
considerable initial advances in a surprise attack,
there is little hope that North Korea could win a war
of attrition against the U.S. and South Korea. The
resulting war almost certainly would result in the
complete destruction of North Korea and its leadership.
South Korea would then dictate the terms of
unification.
2. If North Korea attacked the South it may result in
further international isolation. Although the PRC may
enter the war on the side of North Korea it may also
do nothing. The PRC may not be willing to risk losing
its trade with South Korea by entering the war on the
side of North Korea. It is also doubtful that Russia
would enter the war on the side on North Korea. As
discussed earlier, Russia no longer has a military
treaty with North Korea. As a result of an attack,
110 Edward A. Olsen, "Coping with the Korean Peace Process: An American
View," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. IX, No. 1 (Summer
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North Korea could find itself isolated from its last
ally, the PRC.
2 . South Korea : Pros and Cons of Explosion
South Korea has little to gain if North Korea launches
a surprise attack. The only thing South Korea would gain
is a virtually certain victory if North Korea attacks. As
a result, South Korea would be able to dictate the terms of
unification.
South Korea has a lot to lose if North Korea launches
a desperation attack. The cons of the explosion scenario
from the South Korean perspective are listed below.
1. If North Korea attacked, South Korea would
obviously suffer an enormous loss of life. Much of
South Korea's infrastructure and factories might also
be destroyed, especially in the Seoul area. The costs
to rebuild following the end of the war would be
astronomical and could jeopardize the South Korean
economy.
2. Financing the war itself would also be a huge
drain on the South Korean economy. Estimates of the
cost of fighting a war in Korea vary. Some estimates
1997): 167.
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are as high as 1 trillion dollars. This figure does
not include the costs of rebuilding both North and
South Korea following the end of the war. Although
South Korea would be able to dictate the terms of
unification following the war, this is the least
appealing scenario from the South Korean
perspective.
C. SOFT LANDING SCENARIO
Under the soft landing scenario a unified Korean
Peninsula would emerge from bilateral or multilateral
negotiations involving both North and South Korea. Under
this scenario, both Koreas would agree to and implement the
terms of unification. Under this scenario billions of
dollars in aid would flow from the U.S., Japan, and South
Korea to North Korea in exchange for opening up and
implementing both economic and political reforms.
Unification would be gradual and would slowly occur over a
number of years. What are the pros and cons of negotiated
unification for both North and South Korea?
111 Ki-hwan Kim, "North Korea at the Critical Crossroads," Korea Focus
Vol. 5, No. 3 (May-Jun 1997): 3.
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1 . North Korea : Pros and Cons of Soft Landing
North Korea has a lot to gain from the soft landing
scenario. What are some of the pros of a soft landing for
North Korea?
1. Under the soft landing scenario, North Korea will
play a large role in determining their fate. Under
this scenario, North Korean leadership could negotiate
a power sharing agreement with South Korea, which
would allow them to largely control events in the
north.
2. Negotiated unification would allow North Korea to
slash their military spending. The savings could be
diverted into sorely needed economic development.
3. Foreign investors would probably be much more
willing to invest in North Korea if the threat of war
were diminished. Foreign investment is desperately
needed to modernize the industrial base and
infrastructure
.
4. Negotiated unification would bring an end to
North Korea's political isolation.
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Despite all the pros of a soft landing, North Korea
can also expect some costs from a soft landing. What are
the cons from North Korea's perspective?
1. In order to have a soft landing, North Korea
would have to undertake major economic and political
reforms. In order to make these reforms, North Korea
would have to admit that Juche ideology was a failure.
This admission has the potential of undermining the
credibility of the current leadership in North Korea.
2
.
As the North Korean society opens up and the
standard of living increases, the population may
become restless and seek the democratic freedoms
enjoyed by their cousins to the south. The process of
opening up ultimately could bring down the leadership
of North Korea.
2 . South Korea : Pros and Cons of Soft Landing
For many of the same reasons as North Korea, South
Korea has much to gain through the soft landing scenario.
What are the pros from the South Korean perspective?
1. Like North Korea, South Korea could also slash its
military spending and reinvest the dividends into
their economy.
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2. The costs of unification are estimated at anywhere
from 250 billion to 2 trillion dollars. 112 A soft
landing and gradual unification would allow South





South Korea no longer would be under the constant
threat of war it has been under ever since the end of
the Korean War.
4 South Korean business could benefit from cheap
labor costs in the north. This could prove to be a
boon to the South Korean economy.
Although limited, there are some cons to the soft
landing scenario from the South Korean perspective. What
are the cons for South Korea?
1. Under the other scenarios for unification, South
Korea would largely dictate the terms of unification.
Under this scenario South Korea will have to give in
to some of the desires of North Korea.
2
.
Although other countries would presumably help to
defray the costs of unification, South Korea would
bear the brunt of the costs. The costs of unification
may be a huge drag on the South Korean economy.
112 Olsen, 175.
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3. Unification may slow down the democracy process
in South Korea. The state may become more
authoritarian as it brings in the north.
D. IMPLOSION SCENARIO
Implosion or the sudden collapse of both the economic
and political systems of North Korea could occur in several
ways for many different reasons. Implosion could be either
partial or complete. If North Korea were to partially
implode, another regime would replace the current regime.
However under a partial implosion the country would remain
intact under new leadership. Implosion could also be
complete. Under a complete implosion, North Korea would
cease to exist as a sovereign nation. Implosion could come
about as a result of a military or political coup d'etat.
Implosion could also come from below if mass riots were
started in response to continuing or worsening economic
conditions. Implosion could also occur if Kim Jong II were
to suddenly abdicate in order to avert a coup.
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1 . North Korea : Pros and Cons of Implosion
It is hard to imagine that the current leadership
would benefit from either a partial or complete implosion.
The North Korean people could possibly benefit from either
a partial or complete implosion depending on what new
regime comes into power. A more moderate regime could
replace the current regime. On the other hand the current
regime could be replaced by an even more ideological
authoritarian regime (relative to the current regime) . If
a more authoritarian regime replaces the current one, one
can assume that either the explosion scenario will follow
or the implosion scenario will repeat itself. For
discussion purposes, I will assume that a partial implosion
will result in a more moderate government willing to reform
and negotiate with South Korea.
I will look at the pros of an implosion scenario from
the view of the North Korean people and not the current
regime. What could the North Korean people expect to gain
from a partial implosion?
1 . A new regime could cast aside Juche ideology
without jeopardizing its legitimacy. In fact, the
failure of Juche ideology could be one of the main
reasons a new regime comes into power. If it casts
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aside Juche ideology, the new regime could undertake
massive economic reforms. These reforms would include
Chinese style agrarian reforms and opening to western
investment. The U.S. and South Korea, along with
other countries, would probably be willing to give
large scale economic assistance in return for a
reduction of military forces by the new regime. This
could in turn save North Korea form its current
predicament. In this case, North Korea could survive
as a nation under a new regime.
From the North Korean perspective, a complete
implosion would be devastating. It would mean the end of
the current economic and political system as North Korea is
absorbed by the south.
2 . South Korea : Pros and Cons of Implosion
South Korea could benefit from the implosion scenario.
What are the pros of the implosion from the South Korean
perspective?
1. A partial implosion in North Korea with a moderate
regime replacing the current one would result in the
same benefits as the soft landing scenario.
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2. A complete implosion would also benefit South Korea.
South Korea would no longer be under the threat of war.
3. A complete implosion would allow South Korea to
dictate the terms of unification.
A complete implosion could also have some negative
effects on South Korea. What are the cons to a complete
implosion scenario from the South Korean perspective?
1. The major drawback to a complete implosion would
be the huge economic costs. Unlike the partial
implosion or soft landing scenarios South Korea would
be forced to quickly absorb North Korea. A complete
implosion has the potential to completely destroy or
severely undermine the South Korean economy.
2. South Korea would also face the prospect of a
flood of refuges migrating from the north in search of
food and jobs. This huge flood of people could
overwhelm South Korea.
E. RANKING THE SCENARIOS
Of the three scenarios, the explosion scenario is the
least likely to occur. Although North Korea would hope for
outside assistance from the PRC or Russia if it invades
South Korea it is unlikely to get it. Russia has already
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abrogated the Friendship Treaty military clause and made
clear to North Korea that it will not come to its aid in a
military crisis. In the dispute over the Hwang defection
the PRC sided with South Korea. It is doubtful that the PRC
would enter the war in support of North Korea. Although
though North Korean leaders would hope for outside
assistance, they must realize that the chance of such
assistance is remote.
Due to its current economic conditions, North Korea
would not be able to sustain a major offensive for long.
In order for the explosion scenario to be successful, North
Korea must be able grab a large piece of South Korea and
then be able to hold on to it until they can sue for peace
on their terms. With the current fuel, food, and hard
currency shortages it is unlikely they would be able to
hold out long enough for this scenario to work. Therefore,
although possible, this scenario is highly unlikely.
The soft landing scenario seems to make the most sense
from both the North and South Korean perspectives. Under
this scenario, North Korean leadership could possibly stay
in power. They would be able to get much needed assistance
and investment from the west. However, through opening up
they risk losing control over their people. The soft
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landing scenario would enable the leadership to undertake
PRC style economic reforms. With successful economic
reforms the current leadership could remain in power
indefinitely.
This scenario is also unlikely. Kim Jong II has
already had the opportunity to negotiate but has refused.
He has brought his country to the edge of collapse and
shows no signs of stepping back. The Basic Agreement and
the four way talks are both excellent opportunities to move
in this direction yet he refuses.
The current economic situation, political isolation,
food shortages and defections are all indicators that North
Korea is already in the early stages of collapse. Without
immediate outside assistance and fundamental economic
reforms North Korea will eventually implode. The worst case
scenario from both a North and South Korean perspective is
a complete implosion. The best case scenario is a partial
implosion with a more moderate government coming into
power.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States has pursued three broad policy
objectives in Asia since the end of World War II. They are
1) freedom of the seas; 2) unimpeded access to the markets
of the region; and 3) preventing the domination of the
region by a single power or group of powers. 113 The
impending unification of the Korean Peninsula under the
leadership of Seoul will not change these broad policy
objectives.
A central element of contemporary United States policy
has been the commitment to indefinitely maintain 100,000
forward-deployed troops in Asia. 114 South Korea is host to
37,000 of these forward-deployed troops. Once Korea is
unified the 100,000 troop policy will need to be
reevaluated. The United States will need to maintain a
large number of troops in Korea immediately following
unification. However, once the peninsula is stabilized
under Seoul's leadership, it will be tough to justify
maintaining the current level of American forces in Korea.
113 Holmes and Moore, 52
114 Cohen, 31.
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The primary purpose of stationing 37,000 troops in
South Korea is to discourage North Korea from attacking
South. Once Korea is unified the mission will be
successfully completed.
The bulk of American troops in South Korea are United
States Army personnel. United States Army presence in Korea
should probably decrease after Korea is unified and
conditions on the peninsula are stable.
Asian leaders have come to rely on the United States
policy of maintaining 100,000 forward-deployed troops in
Asia. The policy has increased stability in the region and
helped prevent a potential arms race. If the United States
repatriates forward-deployed troops in Korea after Korean
unification, a potential power vacuum could be created by
their withdrawal.
In order to avert creating a possible power vacuum and
unleashing a potential arms race after withdrawing a large
portion of its forward-deployed forces, the United States
should consider increasing its naval presence in Asia
following Korean unification.
If the United States does increase American naval
presence, it should consider home porting an aircraft
carrier and her escort ships in a unified Korea. To date,
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Japan refuses to allow the United States to station nuclear
aircraft carriers at its bases in Japan. Although the
United States is able to manage this Japanese policy today
by deploying non-nuclear carriers to Japan, it will become
more difficult as the United States retires non-nuclear
carriers and replaces them with nuclear carriers.
Permanently stationing a nuclear carrier in Korea after
unification is one way to resolve this problem. This
policy recommendation is of course contingent upon Korea's
willingness to host a carrier and the United States desire
to maintain a permanently forward-deployed carrier battle
group in Asia following Korean unification.
Home porting a carrier in Korea would not only allow
the United States to maintain naval dominance in the region
but may also reduce tensions within Japan. There is
already domestic political pressure within Japan to kick
out forward-deployed American forces. If the United States
withdraws the majority of its ground forces from Korea,
Japan would be the only host nation in Asia with a large
number of American forward-deployed forces. This would
only add to the political pressure in Japan to oust
American forces. By pursuing this recommended policy the
United States could preempt these political pressures and
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have an alternate site to home port a carrier if Japan does
ask the United States to leave. 115
If this policy is carried out, the United States Army
will likely lose one of its Four Star General billets. As
such, United States Army resistance to this suggested
policy should be expected. The Army is likely to lose the
Four Star billet regardless of whether or not the United
States increases its naval presence if United States force
levels in Korea decline after unification.
A large and continuing naval presence will be required
in order for the United States to meet its policy
objectives in Asia following Korean unification. The
United States will undoubtedly reduce the number of
forward-deployed Army forces in Korea following
unification. If the United States does repatriate a large
number of Army personnel following unification, an
increased naval presence will help maintain stability in
the region. An increased naval presence will 'also
contribute to the United States ability to achieve its
longstanding broad policy objectives in Asia.
115 Christopher Yung, Chang Su Kim, Sung Hwan Wie and Jae-Wook Lee, Naval
Cooperation After Korean Unification
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